

From Universal Food Subsidies To A Self-targeted Program: A Case Study In Tunisian Reform

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Strategies and rationale for fishery subsidy reform

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ABSTRACT

Subsidies can directly support unsustainable fishing practices that harm both ecosystems and long-term social and economic benefits. Global fishery subsidies are substantial, yet their impacts on fishing dynamics are specific to given regions or fisheries at local scales. Subsidies thus have markedly different effects when applied to artisanal versus industrial, or managed versus open-access conditions, as shown for Mexican fisheries. Subsidy reform strategies are critically assessed, drawing on a review of over 30 case studies worldwide to determine patterns in their usefulness and conditions for implementation. Strategies with best relative results are reorienting subsidies away from capacity-enhancement, and/or conditioning them on specific sustainable performance metrics. Decoupling subsidies from fishing (e.g. providing direct aid to fishers) has unpredictable and unclear results, whereas boycott programs tend to have poor outcomes. Eliminating subsidies is perhaps the simplest strategy, but is the most difficult to implement from a social and political perspective. Key factors for any policy to succeed are clear short- and long-term goals; creative design; transparent implementation; and strong socio-political will.

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1. Introduction

A fishery subsidy, according to the World Bank definition, is a "financial contribution from the public sector that grants private benefits to the fishery sector" [1]. Subsidies can thus be used to fund various programs and activities, such as management, research, regulation, infrastructure, tax exemptions, fuel, vessel purchases or direct supplements to income. Globally, an estimated US\$38 billion (2014 USD) in subsidies are granted to the fishery sector [2]. Of this total, around 60% are capacity-enhancing ("bad"), 30% beneficial ("good") and 10% ambiguous ("ugly") [3]. It is thus widely accepted that global subsidies mostly contribute to overfishing, resulting in an annual loss of US\$55 (2014 USD) billion in potential benefits if fisheries operated at economically-optimal levels [1].

The public sector has limited resources, so conferring subsidies to fisheries (or other private sectors) should form part of a plan toward final goals. Traditionally, there are two reasons for

introducing a subsidy [4]. The first is to provide incentives for a sector to take actions that may not otherwise have occurred in the same way. For example, when large-scale fishery subsidies were introduced in many developing countries during the 1970s, a main goal was to accelerate industry growth, which was undoubtedly achieved [5,6]. The second motivation for introducing a subsidy is to address distributional and social equity issues. In this case, the nation adopts subsidies that artificially increase income for workers in a sector to raise their living conditions to an 'acceptable' level. More recently, strategies aimed at environmental conservation are increasingly funded by governments (i.e. beneficial subsidies) at various scales, and funding from non-government organizations—though not subsidies in the strict definition—has become a crucial form of support [7].

Given that most global fisheries reached their ecological limits to production some years ago [5], it would seem that the only defensible reason, aside from purely political motivations, to continue capacity-enhancing fishery subsidies is poverty reduction. However, economic benefits from fishing—unlike, for example, the manufacturing sector—depend directly on ecosystem quality, and fishing, by definition, has (however slight) negative consequences on the ecosystem. Therefore, continuing to subsidize fishing effort on an already overexploited ecosystem will only damage it more, continually diminishing its long-term productivity (e.g., [4,8,9]). In this way, attempts to reduce current

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From universal food subsidies to a self-targeted program: a case study in Tunisian reform (English). Abstract. Scarred by the violent responses to earlier cuts in food subsidy program, the Tunisian Government developed self-targeting Two mutually reinforcing approaches to self-targeting (where the poor From universal food subsidies to a self-targeted program: A case study in Tunisian reform. Tunisia - From universal food subsidies to a self-targeted program (English) After this period, it launched a series of reforms designed to introduce quality differentiation This case study of Tunisia evaluates the effectiveness and makes a mid-term Document Type Pre Economic or Sector Report; Report Number."From Universal Food Subsidies to a Self-Targeted Program: A Case Study in Tunisian Reform," World Bank - Discussion Papers , World Bank. Handle.itkna.com: From Universal Food Subsidies to a Self-Targeted Program: A Case Study in Tunisian Reform (World Bank Discussion Paper) ().From Universal Food Subsidies to a Self-Targeted Program: A Case Study in Tunisian Reform (World Bank Discussion Paper). by World Bank, Education.Discusses the influence of targeted credited intervention programs among participants and non-participants living in program areas From Universal Food Subsidies to a Self-targeted Program: A Case Study in Tunisian Reform, Parts 63 From universal food subsidies to a self-targeted program: a case study in Tunisian reform / Laura Tuck, Subjects, Food supply -- Government policy -- Tunisia.Since the Egyptian food subsidy program uses self-targeting Laura Tuck and Kathy Lindert, From Universal Food Subsidies to a Self-Targeted Program: A Case Study of Tunisian Reform, World Bank Discussion Paper no. (World.From universal food subsidies to a self-targeted program: a case study in Tunisian reform. Translate with google-logo. translator. This translation tool is powered.A Case Study in Tunisian Reform Laura Tuck, Kathy Lindert With self-targeting, subsidized products are available to all (universal provision), but the program.The Distributional Impact of the Egyptian Food Subsidy System Richard H. Adams Subsidies to a Self-Targeted Program: A Case Study of Tunisian Reform.subsidy reform is a 'win-win' policy is therefore misleading there will Tuck, L and Lindert, K (), From Universal Food Subsidies to a Self-Targeted Program: a. Case Study in Tunisian Reform, World Bank Discussion Paper BOX Reforming Food Price Subsidies, Tunisia The Tunisian government has been providing universal access to food subsidies on selected Nevertheless, the Food Subsidy Program remained an important part of the government's safety The major strategic shift was toward self-targeting, achieved in part through the .Our leading case is the cut of subsidies in developing countries where they . decades has been the Tunisian Universal Food Subsidies Program (TUFSP) . reform of the subsidy program was carried out to favour 'self-targeting' by .. Lindert, K., , Self-Targeting of Food Price Subsidies: A Case Study in Tunisian.

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